SecurID algorithm broken?

Michael H. Warfield mhw at WITTSEND.COM
Wed Mar 21 19:09:08 EST 2001


On Wed, Mar 21, 2001 at 09:18:00AM -0000, Stephen Hope wrote:
> Dana et al,

> i sent the email via our product marketing contacts to RSA and i have had a
> response from RSA about the "cracking" of SecureID.

> I dont have the expertise to evaluate the cryptography details, but here is
> the text that we got back.

	I guess you don't.  You mixed up the "RSA Algorithm" with RSA's
"SecurID Algorithm".  Two totally different beasts.

	"SecureID" does not use the "RSA", the public key algorithm, and
the quoted conversation seems to be verbatum taken from some discussions
over a claim by some Philippians that they had cracked the "RSA algorithm"
not Secure ID.

	Apples != Oranges.

	RSA Algorithm != SecureID Algorithm

	You should not that the article noted below is to "An Initial
Cryptanalysis of the RSA SecurID Algorithm".  In this case, "RSA" is
referring to the company "RSA" and not to the "RSA Algorithm".

	The only relationship is that the company "RSA" is the source
of the algorithm.  But they have a LOT of algorithms.

> Stephen
>
>
> Has the RSA algorithm been cracked?
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
	This has nothing to do with the Secure ID algorithm.

> No.  In the days after the most recent news reports surfaced claiming the
> algorithm had been cracked, Ron Rivest (the "R" in RSA) exchanged emails
> with the person who made these claims to analyze his attack.  In short
> order, Rivest determined this attack to be ineffective.  In fact, Rivest's
> analysis showed that this latest attack on the RSA algorithm was "even worse
> than the time required by the naive trial-division approach for factoring,"
> (this is the standard "brute force" attack that is impractical for even
> modest key lengths).  Not surprisingly, several independent observers have
> already posted messages to the most popular crypto chat boards and news
> groups dismissing the significance of these claims.

> RSA is very confident in the strength of the RSA algorithm and has a
> continuous program of rigorous internal and external cryptanalysis to
> maintain state of the art knowledge around the strength of the RSA and other
> algorithms.  As a result, the RSA algorithm has withstood more than 20 years
> of concerted attacks and never been "cracked."  It is precisely because of
> this scrutiny and testing that the RSA algorithm remains one of the most
> secure methods of protecting the privacy and integrity of information in
> electronic form.  As implemented in the RSA BSAFE cryptographic software,
> the RSA algorithm has been embedded in more than 1,000 different software
> applications and hardware products, of which nearly a billion copies have
> been distributed in total.



> Stephen Hope C. Eng, Network Consultant, shope at energis-eis.co.uk,
> Energis Integration Services Ltd, WWW: http://www.energis-eis.co.uk
> Carrington Business Park, Carrington, Manchester , UK. M31 4ZU
> Tel: +44 (0)161 776 4194 Mob: +44 (0)7767 256 180 Fax: +44 (0)161 776
> 4189
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dana J. Dawson [mailto:dana at INTERPRISE.COM]
> > Sent: 14 March 2001 16:30
> > To: VPN at SECURITYFOCUS.COM
> > Subject: Re: SecurID algorithm broken?
> >
> >
> > "Michael H. Warfield" wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, Mar 13, 2001 at 12:42:33AM -0600, Patrick Bryan wrote:
> > > > Can anyone comfirm the, I guess, rumor about SecurID
> > being broken? It came up
> > > > in a discussion recently and I am unsure if it is true.
> > >
> > >         Broken?  Define broken.
> > >
> > >         Published, yes.  It was published on BugTraq a
> > couple of months
> > > ago.  Confirmed, yes.
> > >
> > >         It's also been analyzed by Mudge and KingPing
> > (@Stake) and the
> > > news doesn't look real good.
> > >
> > >         Looks like a 64 bit crypto system with all the
> > attendant strength
> > > against brute forcing.  That being said, the worst thing is
> > that they pass
> > > the users PIN over the wire.  If someone CAN sniff enough
> > tokens and the
> > > target is high enough priority to brute force the 64 bit
> > "secret" then
> > > they already have your PIN and it's game over.
> > >
> > >         But being a high enough profile target to warrent
> > brute forcing
> > > 64 bits is pretty significant.  Sniffing the half dozen
> > tokens on top of
> > > that, makes it tougher (shoulder/desk surfing is possible
> > but tricker to
> > > get the time values right).  Encrypting (SSL) the
> > authenticating link
> > > eliminates the sniffing threat.
> > >
> > >         Broken?  No.  Beaten up, weakened, and staggering?  Maybe.
> > >
> > > > Thanks.
> > >
> > > > VPN is sponsored by SecurityFocus.COM
> > >
> > >         Mike
> > > --
> > >  Michael H. Warfield    |  (770) 985-6132   |  mhw at WittsEnd.com
> > >   (The Mad Wizard)      |  (678) 463-0932   |
> > http://www.wittsend.com/mhw/
> > >   NIC whois:  MHW9      |  An optimist believes we live in
> > the best of all
> > >  PGP Key: 0xDF1DD471    |  possible worlds.  A pessimist is
> > sure of it!
> > >
> > > VPN is sponsored by SecurityFocus.COM
> >
> > Here's an analysis of the SecurID algorithm that some may
> > find interesting:
> >
> >
> > <http://www.atstake.com/research/reports/initial_securid_analysis.pdf>
> >
> > Dana
> >
> > --
> > Dana J. Dawson                              dana at interprise.com
> > Distinguished Principal Engineer            CCIE #1937
> > Qwest Communications International, Inc.    (612) 664-3364
> > 600 Stinson Blvd., Suite 1S                 (612) 664-4779 (FAX)
> > Minneapolis  MN  55413-2620
> >
> > "Hard is where the money is."
> >
> > VPN is sponsored by SecurityFocus.COM
> >
>
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--
 Michael H. Warfield    |  (770) 985-6132   |  mhw at WittsEnd.com
  (The Mad Wizard)      |  (678) 463-0932   |  http://www.wittsend.com/mhw/
  NIC whois:  MHW9      |  An optimist believes we live in the best of all
 PGP Key: 0xDF1DD471    |  possible worlds.  A pessimist is sure of it!

VPN is sponsored by SecurityFocus.COM




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